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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses two aspects of fiscal transparency that
have recently gained importance from the perspective of
central banks in emerging market economies: off-budget
activities and special fiscal funds. The former could be
referred to as “hidden liabilities”; the latter as “hidden assets”
of governments. Because of widespread financing difficulties
in the 1980s and the 1990s, trying to make fiscal liabilities
less transparent was common not just in the emerging market
economies, but also in the advanced industrial countries. In
the 2000s, the turnaround in macroeconomic, external and
fiscal positions of emerging market countries, and the
abundant liquidity in global capital markets (at least through
mid-2007), softened government financing constraints and
led the authorities in many countries to start “hiding” fiscal
surpluses in special vehicles such as sovereign wealth funds.
This paper does not analyse the broader economic forces that
underlie these developments. It focuses instead on the simple
workings of some of the more common off-budget activities
and special fiscal funds.
Section 2 reviews different ways of assessing fiscal positions
by central banks in emerging market economies, with a focus
on off-budget activities. This section is largely based on
responses of central banks from emerging market economies
to a BIS questionnaire (see Mihaljek and Tissot, 2003).
Section 3 discusses the purposes and design of government
asset funds, and outlines some issues they raise for
transparency of central bank and fiscal operations. 
2. HOW CENTRAL BANKS IN EMERGING
MARKETS ASSESS FISCAL POSITIONS
Following the public finance literature, central banks in
emerging economies rely on a range of budget balances in
their analyses of the fiscal position of the government and the
public sector.
2 The choice depends on the aspects of fiscal
policy that are of greatest interest to central banks. The most
common measure of the fiscal position remains the balance of
the cash-based central government budget. This is the simplest
measure of the fiscal balance and the one linked most clearly
to monetary financing of the budget deficit (see IMF, 1986
and 2001). Moreover, information on central budget
positions is usually available on a monthly basis with
relatively short delays. Policymakers in central banks
therefore rely extensively on updates concerning the central
government budget, making various adjustments to arrive at
the measures of fiscal position which are relevant for
monetary policy. Another rationale for this measure is that
the central government typically dominates local
governments in terms of both size and involvement in
financial markets.
In countries with a federal structure of government or large
sub-national governments, it is necessary to look beyond the
This paper reviews how central banks in emerging market countries assess fiscal positions, and discusses two aspects of fiscal
transparency that have recently gained importance from central banks’ perspective: off-budget activities and special fiscal funds.
By increasing uncertainty about the true fiscal position of the government, these activities are of concern both to central banks
that set monetary policy on their own, taking fiscal policy as given, and to those that have adopted an institutional framework
for coordinating monetary and fiscal policies.
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1The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the BIS. Helpful insights and encouragement provided by Gabor P. Kiss are
gratefully acknowledged.
2The discussion in this section refers to 23 emerging market economies from Asia (China, Hong Kong SAR (hereafter, Hong Kong), India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru); central and eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Russia and Turkey); and the Middle East and Africa (Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Africa).
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and government asset fundscentral government to the fiscal positions of state and local
governments. National fiscal authorities have often been
forced to cover the losses and obligations of sub-national
governments, in particular in Latin America. The coverage of
the general government in fiscal accounts has improved in
recent years, but data on the activities of local governments
are usually only available with long delays. In central
European countries, for instance, final outturns of local
government budgets are sometimes known only nine months
after the end of the fiscal year.
There are often considerable difficulties with consolidation
of state and local government data, which may result in
double counting. This creates significant uncertainty for
monetary policy. A related issue is that, despite availability of
fiscal accounts on a general government basis and significant
improvements in fiscal transparency, the budgetary process
and political attention in most emerging economies remain
focused on central government budgets. This is a major
concern for central banks in larger countries, where central
government frequently accounts for less than two thirds of
general government spending. On the other hand, to the
extent that local governments are subject to tight borrowing
limits, their activities need not affect monetary policy or GDP
growth in a significant way.
Off-budget activities
Central banks in emerging economies are increasingly using
more comprehensive public sector accounts in their analyses
(Figure 1). Heightened attention to such indicators has
resulted not only from greater availability of fiscal data, but
also from the realisation that general government fiscal
accounts often exclude extensive quasi-fiscal activities and
contingent liabilities of government and public sector
institutions (see the Appendix for a taxonomy of fiscal risks).
It should also be noted that covering the activities of public
corporations in public sector accounts is not always
straightforward. Many public corporations are run like
private companies and their shares are publicly traded (e.g.
national petroleum companies). Most countries consider
only investments of such firms as government capital
spending.
The last few years have witnessed the emergence of two new
forms of quasi-fiscal activities that have yet to be treated as
part of public sector accounts: public-private partnerships
and sovereign wealth funds. Arguments for including public-
private partnerships in public sector accounts are considered
by P. Kiss (2007) in an accompanying paper in this volume.
Arguments for including sovereign wealth funds in fiscal
accounts have yet to be elaborated. Nonetheless, as the
discussion in Section 3 indicates, there is little doubt that
their activities can have major implications for both fiscal and
monetary policies.
The scope of fiscal activities that remain outside government
budgets is of considerable importance for central banks
because it is difficult to conduct short run monetary policy
without knowing the fiscal position. However, data on such
activities are generally not provided to central banks on a
regular basis. As a result, for many central banks the margin
of uncertainty about the government’s fiscal position often
amounts to several percent of GDP. The following examples
illustrate that any analysis of a country’s fiscal position is far
from complete if it overlooks the obligations the government
has taken on outside its budgetary system.
• Measured fiscal balances in many Latin American countries
during the first half of the 1990s looked better than they
really were because they included privatisation receipts
“above the line” but did not show liabilities such as pension
arrears that were later partly recognised.
• In the Czech Republic, Mexico and Russia sizeable short-
term public sector obligations were hidden in the balance
sheets of weak financial institutions under government
control.
• The crises in Asia (1997-98), Russia (1998) and Turkey
(2001) have shown that when the stability of a country’s
financial system is at risk, markets usually expect the
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 government to provide financial support that far exceeds
its legal obligation.
•  Many emerging economies rely on guarantees, extra-
budgetary funds and state development banks as a non
transparent substitute for budgetary subsidies and for
bypassing budgetary ceilings on government consumption
and investment expenditure. One example is Mexico’s
public works programme Pidiregas (Projects with a
deferred impact on public expenditure recording), worth
an estimated 4% of GDP. It is financed with funds raised
internationally under the guarantee of the federal
government. Spending under this programme is not
registered “above the line” until the project is finished and
received by the public sector.
• China is another striking example of the importance of
the broader public sector for the assessment of the fiscal
position. The official data show that China’s state
budget deficit has hovered at relatively low levels (2-3%
of GDP) over the last 20 years, even though fiscal
activity extends well beyond the official state budget.
Following the formal separation of state-owned
enterprise finances from the budget, the government has
used the banking system extensively to support state-
owned enterprises, and a significant share of these loans
has become non performing. The loan losses of the
state-owned banks, although not legally a liability of the
government, would have to be covered by additional
state resources in the future if deposit liabilities are to be
honoured. If the government’s quasi-fiscal liabilities
from the banking system were included, the broader
fiscal deficit would be significantly larger (estimated at
about 5-6% of GDP by the IMF), as would be the level
of government debt.
3
Table 1 indicates to what extent some of these non
traditional budgetary items are being accounted for in the
fiscal accounts. Off budget expenditure by various
government-supported entities remains largely unaccounted
for. Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the
Philippines, Poland, Russia and Thailand estimate, but do not
include, such expenditure in public sector accounts.
Similarly, contingent liabilities are estimated, but not
included, in public sector accounts in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, India, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines,
Poland and South Africa.
Table 1 does not reveal considerable variation regarding the
types of off budget expenditure and contingent liabilities that
are being accounted for. Most countries identify ex post at
least some of what had previously been contingent liabilities
in their fiscal accounts; examples would be costs associated
with banking failures or the need to clean up liabilities of
entities being privatised. But ex ante coverage rarely extends
to implicit direct liabilities such as future healthcare, pension
and social security obligations of the government. With the
exception of New Zealand, most industrial countries do not
account for such items either.
The last part of Table 1 shows how countries account for
proceeds from privatisation, an asset item that has been quite
important for the assessment of fiscal positions over the past
two decades. Many Asian countries still include proceeds of
government asset sales in budget revenue, i.e. “above the
line” rather than as a financing item. Most emerging
economies, however, distinguish government asset sales as a
special item in the budget, or account for it as a financing
item (i.e. “below the line”). One should also note that
creative accounting of the privatisation proceeds can survive
even in an advanced government accounting framework such
as ESA, when coverage of the government sector is
insufficient.
4 For instance, proceeds from the privatisation of
a profitable, cargo branch of the Hungarian railway company
(which was separated into passenger and cargo branches) are
reportedly being used to subsidise the loss-making, non-
privatised company (former passenger branch). In principle,
this transaction should be rerouted, by recording
privatisation proceeds below-the-line, and the capital transfer
above-the-line.
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3 Recognising the stock of non recoverable bank loans, estimated at between 50-75% of GDP at end 2000 (of which an amount equivalent to 15½% of GDP has been
transferred to asset management companies), would raise public debt to 75-100% of GDP as of end 2000; see IMF (2002).
4 I am indebted to Gábor P. Kiss for this insight.An issue of particular concern for central banks in highly
indebted economies is how to disclose the information on
contingent liabilities to the markets. There is a feeling among
many central bankers that disclosure standards for emerging
economies have become more stringent than for advanced
market economies in recent years. Most central banks agree
that appropriate accounting of contingent liabilities (such as
local government borrowing, extra-budgetary funds and
losses of state-owned enterprises and banks) is necessary in
order to provide the right incentives to policymakers and
borrowers. However, disclosure of previously unrecorded
liabilities may be misinterpreted (Why is the government
revealing the “skeletons in the closet” now? Is there more to
come?), and sometimes gives speculators an idea of
vulnerable points to attack. It has been argued, for instance,
that one could not rely on market analysts to interpret the
information on quasi-fiscal activities correctly: even with the
IMF’s SDDS, there were misinterpretations of the data.
Harmonisation of information was therefore not sufficient;
one also needed to educate the markets. 
Private financial market participants in particular view
sudden jumps in the debt-to GDP ratio as a sign of debt
sustainability problems. There is thus an incentive to reveal
contingent liabilities slowly or not at all. One way to avoid
such jumps in expenditure is to include items such as loan
guarantees in the budget at the time they are approved rather
than when they come due. On the other hand, central banks
that have dealt extensively with different contingent liabilities
feel that one should not wait for a crisis to recognise such
liabilities – if markets have not paid attention to contingent
liabilities before a crisis, they will certainly do so afterwards.
In summary, although central banks and fiscal authorities in
emerging economies are for the most part aware of the need
to look beyond the narrow central government budget, their
assessments of the fiscal positions of the general government
and the public sector are still far from comprehensive. An
additional problem is that the budget-making process
typically retains a one year focus in most countries – in
particular, line ministries’ concerns rarely extend beyond the
current fiscal year. Multi-year fiscal frameworks have been
developed mostly in the context of IMF supported
programmes (Indonesia, Korea, Turkey) or EU accession
(central Europe), or have been in place as part of narrower
budgeting (Hong Kong, Singapore) or planning exercises
(India), rather than as part of a comprehensive
macroeconomic framework.
3. SPECIAL GOVERNMENT ASSET FUNDS
Over the past few years many emerging market countries
have established special government asset funds that are
gradually becoming major institutional investors in global
capital markets. One group of countries that established such
funds are resource-rich economies, which are currently
benefiting from high prices for oil, metal and other
commodities, but over longer periods face considerable
volatility in revenues from exports of these resources.
Another group of countries are emerging market economies
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1 Included in budgetary accounts. 
2 Included in the debt calculation and projections. 
3 Actual audited data. 
4 Only capital gains. 
5 Proceeds from
disinvestments in public sector undertakings. 
6 Included under capital receipts in the budget. 
7 Disposal of assets (ordinary). 
8 Disposal of assets
(privatisation).
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire.
Off budget expenditure
Estimated but not included in the accounts Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru,
1 Philippines, Poland, Russia, Thailand
Not quantified Chile, Czech Republic
Contingent liabilities
Shown as financing or a balance sheet item Indonesia, Russia
Estimated but not included in the accounts Brazil,
2 Chile, Colombia, India, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa
3
Not quantified Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand
Government asset sales
Shown as budget revenue or in government income  Argentina, Chile,
4 China, Hong Kong, India,
5 Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey
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Accounting for special fiscal itemsthat have decided to accumulate substantial foreign exchange
reserves following financial crises of the 1990s and are now
apparently willing to take more risk in their reserve
management policies. Estimates of the size of these funds
vary widely, from around $0.9 trillion (Rozanov, 2005) to
around $2.5 trillion (Morgan Stanley, 2007) in the mid-
2000s.
Special government asset funds can be divided according to
several criteria, including goals or motives for their
establishment; sources of funding; and (current) uses of
resources (Table 2). The demarcation lines within and
between these categories are in practice often blurred. For
instance, many oil funds were originally established with the
goal of stabilising disturbances from volatile export revenue
on the government budget, monetary policy and the
economy. As part of this function, many funds included (or
gradually developed) rules for transferring part of their assets
to the budget, thus assuming a financing function in addition
to the stabilisation function. At some point, fund assets had
to be invested, so they inevitably assumed some wealth
preservation functions as well. And with the sharp and,
perhaps, permanent rise in oil and commodity prices in
recent years, some stabilisation funds have evolved further to
wealth accumulation and saving for future generations.
In terms of sources of funding, the clear-cut cases are rents
and tax revenues from natural resources; sales of
government-owned assets such as land or state-owned
enterprises; and fiscal surpluses. Less clear-cut are the cases
when part of foreign exchange reserves is carved out to form
a sovereign wealth fund – much of foreign exchange reserves
represents borrowed funds on account of sterilised
intervention of foreign exchange inflows to the private sector
– or when assets are transferred from other government-
owned portfolios (e.g. the finance or economy ministries’
equity shares in various companies).
Finally, different funds could be distinguished on the basis of
current uses of their resources: stabilisation of government
budget based on overall fiscal developments (“needs-based”
stabilisation); rules-based financing of a certain proportion of
government expenditure; and the prevailing use of fund
resources, for instance, infrastructure development, financial
market development (e.g. recapitalisation of financial
institutions) or external debt repayment.
Stabilisation funds
Countries relying on exports of natural resources face
macroeconomic stabilisation challenges on several fronts.
First, revenue streams associated with such exports tend to be
very large and very volatile.
5 Second, the use of foreign
exchange inflows from natural resource exports can have
major effects on macroeconomic stability and economic
structure. In particular, the domestic use of the inflows
generally leads to an appreciation of the real effective
exchange rate and a loss of competitiveness in the non-
resource based tradable sectors of the economy. Third, much
of the revenue from natural resource exports accrues to the
government; spending of this revenue is thus subject to
political influence and potential waste.
These considerations provide a rationale for the
establishment of stabilisation funds for non-renewable
resources, which are essentially mechanisms designed to
reduce the impact of volatile foreign exchange inflows on the
economy (and/or of volatile revenue on the government
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Goals/motives for establishment Source of funding Uses of fund resources
Stabilisation of macroeconomic impact of natural  Natural resource rents and taxes Fiscal stabilisation (needs-based)
resource revenue 
Fiscal surplus External debt repayment
Saving/intergenerational transfers
Government asset sales  Rules-based financing of government 
Sovereign wealth management (land, privatisation revenues) expenditure
Fiscal surplus
Transfer of other government-owned assets  Infrastructure/financial market development
(company shares, foreign exchange reserves)  Funding of future pension and health care 
Borrowed funds (sterilised intervention
liabilities 




Taxonomy of special government asset funds
5 Oil exports accounted on average for 65% of total exports and 26% of GDP in OPEC member countries during 2001-04. Regarding volatility, the standard deviation of
the ratio of oil exports to GDP was 3.2 percentage points, compared with total GDP volatilities in industrial countries of about 2 percentage points of GDP.budget) by transferring this impact to the fund. The fund’s
objectives may also include supporting fiscal and monetary
discipline and providing greater transparency in the foreign
exchange market and the spending of government revenue.
For instance, most stabilisation funds allow the inflows to pay
off public sector external debt as this automatically redirects
the inflows abroad and thus limits the impact on the local
economy. 
Many oil-exporting countries – including Algeria, Norway,
Russia, Venezuela and several Central Asian and Persian Gulf
countries – have established oil stabilisation funds. Many of
these funds – eg the Russian Federation’s Stabilisation Fund
– are designed to accumulate resources when the oil price or
revenue exceeds some threshold, and to pay out when the
price or revenue falls below a second threshold. Chile’s
copper stabilisation fund, established in 1985, has rules of
accumulation and withdrawal that are based on a reference
copper price set annually by a panel of experts advising the
government. The existence of such a fund helps the
government resist expenditure pressures during upswings in
copper prices, and reduces the need to borrow during the
downswings.
Some funds additionally have operational rules designed so
that they regularly finance a part of government expenditure.
In Norway, for instance, the expected real return on the
fund, assumed to be 4% of the fund’s market value, can be
transferred to the central government budget each year. By
providing an explicit and transparent link between asset
accumulation and the budget, such rules-based financing
shields the budget from revenue uncertainty and volatility.
One should note that stabilisation funds do not deal with
spending or deficits at the government level. If there is
insufficient control of spending or deficits on the regular
budget, the operation of the fund cannot ensure fiscal
discipline. This provides a rationale for supplementing
stabilisation funds with special fiscal rules. For instance, the
government in Chile has to generate a 1% surplus on its
structural fiscal balance each year, estimated by removing the
effects of variations in copper prices and the economic cycle
on revenues.
Savings funds 
Revenue from non-renewable resources constitutes national
wealth that can be approximated by the rent earned in their
production, essentially the proceeds from projected future
sales after deduction of relevant extraction costs (including
profits accruing to the companies involved). Using the
principle of intergenerational equity one can argue that this
national wealth should be managed in a manner that will
leave future generations at least as well off as the current one.
The idea to create a store of wealth for future generations
represents the savings motive for the establishment of special
foreign asset funds. 
The savings motive does not preclude spending part of the
resource revenue. In many countries there is a clear need to
build up or upgrade domestic infrastructure, clean-up the
financial sector from old debts or strengthen its capital base
after a crisis, and improve the quality of public services. The
present generation could thus use up part of the natural
resource wealth and leave future generations wealth in the
form of physical infrastructure, a more stable financial system
and improved public institutions. Such public expenditure
could also crowd in private investment in the process. The
decision about the form of asset accumulation – financial vs.
real – would depend on the absorptive capacity of the
economy. One danger is that investment spending might rise
to an unsustainable level, or that too quick an increase might
result in poor-quality projects. In addition, a perception that
resources are readily available for domestic uses could create
incentives for rent seeking and make the fund prone to abuse. 
Savings funds have for instance been established in Norway,
Alberta, Alaska and Kuwait. Norway’s Petroleum Fund,
established in 1990 (now called the Government Pension
Fund – Global), collects all government’s net income from oil
and invests it in financial assets to be drawn upon in the
future. The present generation benefits from interest income
earned on fund’s investments. The future generation benefits
from a permanent stream of income on financial assets that
have replaced oil in the ground.
Sovereign wealth funds 
The main objective of some large government asset funds is
neither stabilisation nor accumulation of new saving but
rather the management of new assets. Funds with this main
objective could be termed “sovereign wealth funds”. Some of
these sovereign wealth funds were carved out of existing
official foreign exchange reserves. Others, such as
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, Abu
Dhabi Investment Authority and Kuwait Investment
Authority have operated for several decades as institutional
investors managing the government’s assets portfolios. One
should note that the distinction between sovereign wealth
funds and saving funds such as Norway’s petroleum fund
becomes less clear as the size of accumulated savings
increases. After some threshold, it becomes intuitively clear
that enough savings has been accumulated – in the case of
Norway, almost 100% of GDP – and the main issue becomes
how to manage the fund’s assets prudently while realising a
reasonable rate of return.
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wealth funds have attracted attention because of the size of
their assets – especially in emerging Asia and the Middle East
– which is comparable with some of the largest public
pension plans and central bank reserves in the world. For
instance, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, founded in
1976, is responsible for investing all of the Abu Dhabi
government’s oil revenues and assets in international capital
markets. Its size is estimated conservatively at $500 billion,
and up to $875 billion according to some private sector
estimates. A few decades ago the government of Singapore
created two investment arms: Temasek holdings, which
manages government shares in many of Singapore’s largest
companies; and the Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation (GIC), which invests primarily the government’s
foreign reserves.
A recent example of a sovereign wealth fund is Korea
Investment Corporation. It was launched in 2005 with a
capital of 100 billion won funded by the foreign exchange
stabilisation fund. It will initially manage $20 billion of
Korea’s foreign exchange reserves with the objectives of
generating return on foreign currency assets and fostering the
development of Korea’s asset management business. A similar
case is State Investment Corporation, established in
September 2007, which will initially manage $200 billion out
of $1.4 trillion in China’s foreign exchange reserves. Russia’s
oil stabilisation fund will be split into a reserve fund and a
fund for future generations starting in February 2008.
Sovereign wealth funds take different forms and pursue
different objectives but share one common characteristic:
their origin lies in the prior accumulation of very large
foreign exchange or fiscal reserves. As central banks and
governments have become more comfortable with the level
of reserves, they started to transfer a part of reserves to non-
traditional purposes such as government investment
corporations (Korea, Malaysia) or restructuring of state-
owned commercial banks (China). In addition to conceptual
issues, this shift in perspective raises a number of questions
about the institutional locus, investment guidelines and
governance of foreign asset funds.
Governance, transparency 
and accountability
Best practices have already been developed for governance of
commodity-based funds and they generally mirror best
practices for fiscal transparency (IMF, 2005). They highlight
government and civic representation, access to dedicated
expertise, accountability and transparency. A typical model
governance structure includes enabling legislation (which
includes the basic tenets of the fund, but not specific eligible
investment instruments, portfolio parameters or
benchmarks); a board of trustees comprising representatives
from the government and legislature, or independent experts
answerable to the legislature; and an investment management
agent. The board typically formulates investment policy (in
particular the strategic asset allocation), while the actual asset
management can be performed by either a specialised
government agency or the central bank. Asset management
could also be subcontracted to private investment managers,
with their selection decided in a similar way as for other
government procurements. 
Best practices for non-commodity-based SWFs have yet to be
developed. For existing funds, actual practices span the
whole spectrum, from full public disclosure and independent
oversight of the rules and operations (as in Norway), to the
exercise of more or less full discretion on the part of the
authorities controlling the fund. In some cases, the provision
of information about SWF operations is not allowed under
local legislation. Control and oversight of funds in these
institutions is usually restricted to a handful of key
government officials. Thus, no information is available about
their internal checks and balances, investment strategy or
commercial goals. 
Central banks have frequently played a role in designing the
institutional setup of SWFs; in particular, how far the fund
should be integrated with central bank operations or rather
operated as a stand-alone entity. Direct central bank
involvement in the management of wealth funds has the
advantage of maintaining centralised control of SWF assets in
one place and avoiding the additional costs of setting up a
new and untested management entity. This reflects the fact
that many central banks already have systems and skills to
manage equity and other higher-return investments. The
integrated approach could also allow faster reaction to
market developments.
6
Most SWFs nonetheless exist as stand-alone institutions. One
major advantage of such an approach is that it insulates core
central bank responsibilities, such as maintaining monetary
and financial stability, from potential conflicts of interest.
Another advantage is that wealth management is a different
discipline from liquidity management. Even if both can be
separated at the operational level, under any form of
integrated approach the reporting lines might feed into the
same group of senior central bank managers and board
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6 For instance, when Hong Kong’s currency and equity markets were simultaneously under speculative attack in August 1998, coordination of official actions in foreign
exchange and stock markets was helped by the fact that all decisions were taken within the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.members, who might not have the same optimal risk-return
trade-off as the government had mandated. A related issue is
that of reputational risk: any significant loss suffered by an
SWF operated by the central bank might harm the bank’s
reputation. 
A midway solution is to establish a separate unit within the
central bank to manage the SWF. In the case of Norway, the
owner of the fund is the finance ministry, while operational
management of the fund is delegated to the Norwegian
central bank, with a mandate stipulated in a regulation issued
by the ministry. The central bank established the fund as an
independent wing, along the lines of an investment bank.
Most fund managers come from outside the central bank and
have experience in investment banking. Different reporting
channels and different pay scales are used for fund managers
and central bank officials. Responsibility for investment
decisions always rests with a single fund manager. The central
bank reports on fund operations to the finance ministry each
quarter.
The benefits and costs of different governance arrangements
are difficult to evaluate without considering the broader
socio-political framework in countries where the funds are
established. If the overall budget system is poor it is doubtful
that a better subsystem can be created to deal with resource
revenue and foreign assets. In a number of cases (e.g. Nigeria,
Venezuela), oversight of natural resource funds has not
always been adequate and assets of the funds were
misallocated in the past (see Davis et al, 2003; Fasano, 2000;
Mihaljek, 2005). Conversely, sovereign funds that have
generated visible benefits for the population at large can be
found both in economies that practice very transparent
governance arrangements (e.g. Norway, Alaska, Alberta) and
those that do not consider such arrangements necessary (e.g.
Southeast Asian and Persian Gulf countries).
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Liabilities Direct Contingent
(obligation in any event) (obligation if a particular event occurs)
Explicit
Government liability as recognised by a law or
contract
Implicit
A moral obligation of government that reflects
public and interest-group pressures
• Foreign and domestic sovereign borrowing
(loans contracted and securities issued by
central government)
• Budgetary expenditures
• Budgetary expenditures legally binding in the
long term (civil servants’salaries and pensions)
• Future public pensions (as opposed to
government civil service pensions), if not
required by law
• Social security schemes, if not required by law
• Future health care financing, if not required by
law
• Future recurrent costs of public investments
• State guarantees for non sovereign borrowing
and obligations issued to sub-national
governments and public and private sector
entities (development banks)
• Umbrella state guarantees for various types of
loans (mortgage loans, student loans,
agriculture loans, small business loans)
• Trade and exchange rate guarantees on private
investments
• State guarantees on private investments
• State insurance schemes (deposit insurance,
income from private pension funds, crop
insurance, flood insurance, war risk insurance)
• Defaults of sub-national government or public
or private entities on non guaranteed debt and
other obligations
• Cleanup of liabilities of entities being privatised
• Banking failure (support beyond state
insurance)
• Failure of a non guaranteed pension fund,
employment fund, or social security fund
(protection of small investors)
• Default of central bank on its obligations
(foreign exchange contracts, currency defence,
balance of payments stability)
• Bailouts following a reversal in private capital
flows
• Environmental recovery, disaster relief, military
financing
Table 3
The fiscal risk matrix
Source: Polackova (1999).